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Abstract—We consider networks of queues in
which the different operators of individual queues
may cooperate to reduce the amount of waiting. More
specifically, as a first step we focus on Jackson tandem
networks in which the total capacity of the servers
can be redistributed over all queues in any desired
way. If we associate a cost to waiting that is linear
in the queue lengths, it is not difficult to see that the
long run total cost is minimized when the operators
equally share the available service capacity.
The main question we try to answer is whether
or not (the operators of) the individual queues will
indeed cooperate in this way, and if so, how they will
share the cost in the new situation. We find answers
to this question for two- and three-node networks.
Keywords: game theory, tandem queue, coopera-
tion, capacity allocation, cost allocation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider a queueing network consisting of dif-
ferent queues, and assume that each of these is
operated by a different operator. By working to-
gether (in some way), the operators can optimize
the performance of the network (in some sense),
leading to a social optimum with minimum total
cost for the operators. On the other hand, individual
operators will try to minimize their own cost, and
will only cooperate if this is to their own benefit.
This explains our idea of analyzing such networks
using cooperative game theory.
In particular, we can view the different operators
as decision makers (or players) in a so-called
cooperative cost game, see e.g. [7]. In such a game,
the players make binding agreements (as opposed
to noncooperative games) to jointly optimize the
total cost they need to pay, and then try to share
this cost by finding a fair cost allocation. Typically,
a cost allocation is fair if it lowers the cost for each
possible coalition (i.e. for any group of players).
If this is not the case, then full cooperation is not
beneficial, but there may still be partial cooperation
between some (but not all) players.
When we try to model a queueing network as
described above, there are a number of choices to
be made. First of all, (i) one can think of a variety
of ways in which the operators may work together,
including sharing service capacity, sharing buffer
capacity, or changing the routing structure; more-
over any of these can be done dynamically or
statically (i.e. dependent on the current state of the
network or not). Furthermore, (ii) different network
topologies may be considered. Similarly, (iii) traffic
characteristics, i.e. the behaviour of the arrival
process(es) and service demands, can be modeled
in many ways. Finally, (iv) the performance of the
total network and its individual queues, and the
associated cost, can be measured in many ways.
In this paper we study an initial model to in-
vestigate whether this line of research is useful
to pursue. In this model we make the following
assumptions: (i) the different servers are able to
share their service capacity, and do so in a static
way; (ii, iii) the network is an n-node tandem
Jackson network, see e.g. [8]: customers arrive
according to a Poisson process at queue 1, then
(after service) move to queue 2, etcetera, until they
leave the system (after service at queue n); service
times are all exponentially distibuted; (iv) we take
the cost at queue i to be proportional to the long run
expected queue length, or equivalently (by Little’s
law), proportional to the expected sojourn time of
customers in queue i; furthermore, the total cost of
a group of queues is just the sum of the costs of the
individual queues (thus, there is no cost associated
to the cooperation itself). Even though this model
is admittedly very elementary, we find it exhibits
some interesting and non-trivial behavior.
In the queueing literature there are many refer-
ences in which the queues in a network cooperate
(sharing capacity, pooling resources, etc.) to reach
some form of optimality, e.g. [2], [6]. However,
in most cases the whole network is (implicitly)
supposed to be run by a single operator. The
combination of the queueing model with game
theory, in which different operators are only willing
to cooperate if a good cost allocation can be
found, is to the best of our knowledge hardly
studied so far. Some related references are the
following. Gonza´lez and Herrero [5] study several
medical departments that may share an operating
theatre. The cost of each department is linear in
the capacity needed to satisfy a maximum on
the expected waiting time of its patients. It is
shown that cooperation reduces the total cost, and
that a cost allocation can be determined based
on the Shapley value. In [4], Garcı´a-Sanz et al.
extend this model and study cooperation among
Markovian queues that share a common server with
preemptive priority discipline. The authors show
that a cost allocation proportional to the arrival
rates is fair. More recently, Anily and Haviv [3]
study cooperation in service capacity management.
A number of servers pool their capacities and
customers. The cost of cooperation is the mean
number of customers in the pooled system. It is
shown that fair cost allocations always exist. In
particular, servers with large capacities may receive
payment for cooperation. In these three papers,
the servers that cooperate are independent servers.
One way in which our paper contributes is that we
consider cooperation in a network of queues, while
preserving the autonomy of the individual queues;
we do not allow for pooling. Finally, we mention
Altman et al. [1] who give an extensive survey
on networking games. The models and papers
discussed in this reference mostly deal with non-
cooperative game theory, the only exception being
a short section focused on bargaining games, which
strengthens our belief that the problem formulation
and approach in the current paper have not been
studied before.
We end this section with a short overview of the
remainder of the paper: in Section II we introduce
the model in more detail and derive the optimal
capacity allocation. Also we recall the basics of
cooperative game theory here. Then, in Section III
we derive the results on two- and three-node net-
works, and give some partial results for larger
tandem networks. We conclude in Section IV, also
sketching some main lines for future research.
II. MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES
In this section we first introduce our model in
detail, and derive the optimal capacity allocation.
Then we recall the basics of cooperative game
theory, focusing on the solution concept of the
core, which is the set of all cost allocations that
are acceptable to all possible coalitions of queues.
The last subsection shows how our tandem model
fits into the framework of cooperative game theory.
A. Model
We consider an n-node tandem Jackson net-
work, denoting the set of all queues by N =
{1, 2, . . . , n}. Customers arrive at queue 1 ac-
cording to a Poisson process with rate λ. The
(exponential) service capacity at queue i is given
by μi, and we assume μi > λ. The cost incurred
at queue i is represented by the long run expected
queue length λ/(μi − λ). Furthermore, the total
cost of any subset S ⊂ N of queues is the sum of
the costs of the individual queues in S.
Importantly, we assume that the queues in any
subset S may cooperate to improve their perfor-
mance and save on costs. Cooperation here means
that the queues in S may redistribute their service
capacities among each other. Denoting the service
capacity of queue i after redistribution by mi, this
leads to the following optimization problem for the
set S:
min
mi,i∈S
∑
i∈S
λ
mi − λ
s.t.
∑
i∈S
mi =
∑
i∈S
μi,
mi > λ, i ∈ S.
To solve this problem, we first consider it without
the second constraint, and rewrite it as
min
α,mi,i∈S
∑
i∈S
λ
mi − λ − α
(∑
i∈S
mi −
∑
i∈S
μi
)
,
where α is the Lagrange multiplier. Taking deriva-
tives leads to the solution
mi =
∑
i∈S μi
|S| for all i ∈ S,
where |S| is the number of queues in S. This
solution automatically satisfies the second con-
straint mi > λ since μi > λ. Also, since the
function λ/(μ − λ) is convex in μ, our solution
is the optimal capacity allocation. If we denote the
average capacity of the queues in subset S by μ¯S =∑
i∈S μi/|S|, we can express the corresponding
minimal cost for the set S of (cooperating) queues
as
c(S) = |S| λ
μ¯S − λ. (1)
Notice that in the optimal capacity allocation,
capacities are redistributed such that all queues
have the same capacity μ¯S and the same expected
number of customers. Consequently, all queues
contribute the same amount to the cost for S,
namely λ/(μ¯S − λ).
B. Preliminaries on cooperative cost games
A cooperative cost game is represented by a
pair (N, c). The set N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of
players. A coalition S is a (nonempty) group of
players, that is, a nonempty subset of N . The cost
function c assigns to each coalition S a certain cost
c(S).
In our analysis we will need the concept of
marginal vectors, and monotonicity. Let σ be a
permutation of the player set. Then σ(k) is the
player in position k. Denote by Pσ(i) = {j ∈
N |σ−1(j) < σ−1(i)} the set of players in positions
before player i. Now imagine that the players enter
a room one by one in the ordering indicated by
σ, and that each player has to pay the marginal
contribution to the total cost when he enters the
room. Then player i pays
mσi = c(Pσ(i) ∪ {i})− c(Pσ(i)).
The vector mσ = (mσ1 , . . . ,m
σ
n) is called the
marginal vector corresponding to the permuta-
tion σ. Further, a cost game is called monotone
increasing (respectively decreasing) if S ⊆ T
implies c(S) ≤ c(T ) (respectively c(S) ≥ c(T )).
If for any two disjoint coalitions S and T of
players it is beneficial to cooperate, we say the
game is subadditive. In this case, cooperation never
leads to higher cost when compared to working
separately:
c(S ∪ T ) ≤ c(S) + c(T ). (2)
Remark 1. Notice that in a subadditive game the
choice T = N \ S in (2) implies c(N) ≤ c(S) +
c(N \ S). Thus, if we split the coalition N of all
players in two parts, namely the coalitions S and
N \ S, then the total cost does not decrease. This
is an incentive for all the players in coalition N to
cooperate. 
The main question that remains is how the total
joint cost c(N) should be allocated among the
players. A first step towards selecting a good and
fair cost allocation is to consider allocations in the
core C(N, c) of the game (N, c), which is defined
as
C(N, c) =
{
y ∈ RN
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈N
yi = c(N);
∑
i∈S
yi ≤ c(S) for all S ⊂ N
}
.
If the cost is allocated among the players according
to an allocation in the core, then any coalition S
pays at most its own costs c(S). Hence, no coali-
tion has an incentive to break up the cooperation
with coalition N .
We are now ready to view the tandem queue
problem as a cooperative cost game.
C. Tandem games
Based on the optimal capacity allocation of a
group of queues in our n-node tandem Jackson
network, see Subsection II-A, we can now define
a corresponding cooperative cost game. From now
on we refer to this game as a tandem game.
Definition. A tandem game is a cost game (N, c)
with the set of queues N = {1, . . . , n} as player
set. The cost c(S) of coalition S ⊆ N is given by
(1).
Proposition 1. The following properties hold.
(i) Tandem games are not monotone decreasing,
unless all capacities μi are equal.
(ii) For all n ≥ 2, n-node tandem games may or
may not be monotone increasing.
(iii) Tandem games are subadditive.
Proof. For (i), assume without loss of generality
that μ1 < μ2, and let T = {1, 2} and S = {2}.
Then μ¯T < μ2 immediately implies c(S) =
λ/(μ2 − λ) < 2λ/(μ¯T − λ) = c(T ).
To prove (ii), we construct two concrete exam-
ples. A (non-trivial) example of an n-node mono-
tone increasing tandem game can be found by
choosing the capacities sufficiently close together,
e.g. take λ = 1 and all μi inside the interval
[2−ε, 2+ε] for some ε. Then the cost of any k-node
coalition lies inside [k/(1+ε), k/(1−ε)]. By taking
ε < 1/(2k + 1) we can ensure that these intervals
do not overlap for different k ≤ n. On the other
hand, any n-node tandem game with μ2 > 3μ1−2λ
is not monotone increasing since for T = {1, 2} we
have c(T ) = 2λ/(μ¯T −λ) < λ/(μ1−λ) = c({1}).
To prove (iii) we substitute (1) in (2), which
leads to
λ
μ¯S∪T−λ ≤
|S|
|S|+|T |
λ
μ¯S−λ +
|T |
|S|+|T |
λ
μ¯T−λ.
Since
μ¯S∪T =
|S|
|S|+ |T | μ¯S +
|T |
|S|+ |T | μ¯T ,
the result follows by the convexity of λ/(μ−λ) as
a function of μ. 
The fact that tandem queues are usually not
monotone is not helpful for the analysis of the
core. Before we move on to this in Section III, we
present some weaker monotonicity results. In the
following proposition we show that the total cost of
any coalition may increase or decrease by adding
queues with sufficiently low or high capacity to the
coalition.
Proposition 2. Consider two coalitions S and T
satisfying S ⊆ T ⊆ N . Then c(S) ≤ c(T ) is
equivalent with
μ¯T\S ≤ μ¯S + |T ||S| (μ¯S − λ). (3)
In the particular case where T \S only contains a
single node, say T = S ∪ {i} with i /∈ S, we have
the following.
(i) A simple sufficient condition for c(S) ≤ c(T )
(increasing cost when adding queue i to S)
is given by μi ≤ μ¯S .
(ii) When |S| > 2 a simple sufficient condition
for c(S) > c(T ) (decreasing cost when
adding queue i to S) is given by μi >∑
j∈S μj .
Proof. Using (1) we have that c(S) ≤ c(T ) is
equivalent to
|S|
μ¯S − λ ≤
|T |
μ¯T − λ.
Since we also know that
μ¯T =
|S|μ¯S + (|T | − |S|)μ¯T\S
|T |
= μ¯S +
|T | − |S|
|T | (μ¯T\S − μ¯S),
this can be rewritten as
|S|(μ¯S+ |T | − |S||T | (μ¯T\S−μ¯S)−λ) ≤ |T |(μ¯S−λ).
Solving for μ¯T\S leads to (3).
When T = S∪{i} with i /∈ S, we have μ¯T\S =
μi. Statement (i) is then immediate. For statement
(ii) we need to show that∑
j∈S
μj > μ¯S +
|S|+ 1
|S| (μ¯S − λ)
holds when |S| > 2. Dividing by μ¯S yields
|S| > 1 + |S|+ 1|S| (1−
λ
μ¯S
),
or
1− λ
μ¯S
<
|S|(|S| − 1)
|S|+ 1 ,
which is indeed true when |S| > 2 since the right-
hand side is then larger than 1 while the left-hand
side is less than 1. 
Remark 2. For a two-node tandem queue with
μ1 < μ2, the first part of this proposition enables
us to deduce that the game is monotone increasing
if and only if μ1 ≥ 13μ2 + 23λ. See also the proof
of Proposition 1, part (ii).
Remark 3. Notice that in all of the above we
consider whether the total cost of a coalition in-
creases or decreases by adding other queues. If we
want to compare the cost per queue, the situation
is less complicated: the average cost per queue will
simply increase (respectively decrease) if we add
queues to S with average capacity that is smaller
(respectively higher) than μ¯S .
As mentioned before, in the next section we
study the core of tandem games. In particular we
want to know if fair cost allocations always exist.
That is, if the core is always a nonempty set.
III. MAIN RESULTS
In this section we first derive results on the core
of two- and three-node networks. Then we point
out how larger networks differ from three-node
networks.
A. Two-node tandem games
For two-node tandem games, we have the fol-
lowing result.
Theorem 3. Tandem games corresponding to two-
node networks have a nonempty core.
Proof. This follows immediately from the subaddi-
tivity property (2) of tandem games, see Remark 1.

We give an example to illustrate that the core
can easily be found explicitly in this case.
Example 1. Consider a two-node network with
arrival rate λ = 1/4 and service rates (μ1, μ2) =
(1/3, 2/3). The costs of the coalitions are c({1}) =
3, c({2}) = 3/5, and c(N) = 2. By Theorem 3
cooperation is worthwhile since cost savings are
achieved: c(N) < c({1}) + c({2}). The core of
the game is nonempty and equals
C(N, c) = {(x, 2− x) |7/5 ≤ x ≤ 3} .

Notice that in this example there exist core
allocations such that the cost allocated to the
second queue is negative, for example (3,−1). In
such allocations the second queue gets paid for
its cooperation. Note that the second queue has
the largest capacity; its contribution is so valuable
that this queue may receive payment to cooperate.
This phenomenon is not always present, e.g. when
(μ1, μ2) = (2/5, 3/5), we have c({1}) = 5/3,
c({2}) = 5/7, c(N) = 2 and C(N, c) =
{(x, 2− x) |9/7 ≤ x ≤ 5/3} .
B. Three-node tandem games
A similar result holds for three-node networks.
For these networks we identify two cost allocations
that belong to the core.
Theorem 4. Tandem games corresponding to
three-node networks have a nonempty core. In
particular, if σ is a permutation such that the queue
with middle service capacity1 is in first position,
then the marginal vector mσ(c) is a cost allocation
that belongs to the core of the game.
Proof. Without loss of generality assume that μ1 ≥
μ2 ≥ μ3. Then queue 2 is the queue with middle
service capacity. There are two marginal vectors
in which node 2 is in first position, σ(1) = 2,
namely m213(c) and m231(c). Here we denote σ by
σ(1)σ(2)σ(3). Consider the first marginal vector.
The marginal contributions of the nodes are
m2131 (c) = c({1, 2})− c({2}),
m2132 (c) = c({2}),
m2133 (c) = c(N)− c({1, 2}).
We proceed by checking the core-conditions:
• m2131 (c) ≤ c({1}): true by subadditivity;
• m2132 (c) ≤ c({2}): true (with equality);
• m2133 (c) ≤ c({3}): true by subadditivity;
• m2131 (c) + m
213
2 (c) ≤ c({1, 2}): true (with
equality);
• m2131 (c) +m
213
3 (c) ≤ c({1, 3}): true by sub-
additivity;
• m2132 (c) +m
213
3 (c) ≤ c({2, 3}): see below;
• m2131 (c) +m
213
2 (c) +m
213
3 (c) = c(N): true.
The condition related to coalition {2, 3} is
c({2}) + c(N)− c({1, 2}) ≤ c({2, 3}). (4)
This can be shown by straightforward calculations:
c(N) + c({2})
≤ λ
μ¯{1,2} − λ +
λ
μ¯{2,3} − λ +
λ
μ¯{1,3} − λ
+
λ
μ2 − λ
1If two or three queues have equal capacity, either of these
can be chosen as ‘the’ queue with middle service capacity.
≤ λ
μ¯({1,2} − λ +
λ
μ¯{2,3} − λ +
λ
μ¯{1,2} − λ
+
λ
μ¯{2,3} − λ
=
2λ
μ¯{1,2} − λ +
2λ
μ¯{2,3} − λ
= c({1, 2}) + c({2, 3}).
The second inequality follows from the convexity
of λ/(μ− λ) in μ.
For the second marginal vector m231(c), the
marginal contributions of the nodes are
m2131 (c) = c(N)− c({2, 3}),
m2132 (c) = c({2}),
m2133 (c) = c({2, 3})− c({2}).
As above, the core-conditions can be checked to
hold, either with equality, or by subadditivity. The
only exception is the condition related to coalition
{1, 2}: c(N) − c({2, 3}) + c({2}) ≤ c({1, 2}),
which is equivalent to (4) and therefore also holds.
This proves the result. 
The theorem above shows that also three-node
tandem games have a nonempty core. Notice that
any convex combination of the two abovemen-
tioned marginal vectors also belongs to the core
because this is a convex set.
Cost allocations in the core of three-node tan-
dem games may have negative elements — the
corresponding queue receives payment to cooperate
— as was the case for two-node networks. For
example, consider the situation in Example 1, and
add a third queue with capacity μ3 = 1/3. Accord-
ing to Theorem 4, the cost allocation m123(c) =
(3,−1, 13/7) belongs to the core of the game.
Node 2 has the largest service capacity, and may
be paid for cooperation.
The two particular cost allocations identified in
Theorem 4 are such that the queue with middle
service capacity does not gain from cooperation.
That is, the cost that is allocated to this queue is
the same as its stand-alone cost c({i}). Below we
characterize the conditions under which all cost
allocations in the core have this property.
Proposition 5. Consider a three-node network. Let
queue i be the queue with middle service capacity.
If this capacity is equal to the average capacity of
the other queues, μi =
∑
j =i μj/2, then queue i
does not gain from cooperation: xi = c({i}) for
all cost allocations x in the core C(N, c) of the
tandem game.
Proof. Without loss of generality let i = 2 be the
queue with middle service capacity. Let x be a
cost allocation in the core C(N, c). By definition
of the core, this allocation satisfies the restrictions
x2 ≤ c({2}), x1 + x3 ≤ c({1, 3}), and x1 + x2 +
x3 = c(N) = c({2}) + c({1, 3}) (where the latter
equality follows from μ2 = (μ1 + μ3)/2). Com-
bining these restrictions results in x2 = c({2}). 
Remark 4. One may be inclined to argue that
when a player does not gain from cooperation, as in
the context of Proposition 5, he may refrain from
cooperation to prevent extra benefit for the other
players. However, it is easy to see that his decision
to cooperate or not does not affect the cost paid (or
amount gained) by the other players. The reason is
that his service capacity equals the average capacity
of all (other) players, and that the cost paid by the
other (cooperating) players is based on this same
average capacity.
C. Tandem games with more than three nodes
It is not easy to obtain results for n-node tandem
Jackson networks with n > 3. If all queues
have equal service capacities, then we obtain the
following obvious result.
Proposition 6. Consider an n-node tandem Jack-
son network in which all queues have equal ca-
pacity, μi = μ for all i. Then the core of the
corresponding tandem game consists of a single
allocation x with xi = λ/(μ− λ) for all i.
Proof. Let S be a coalition of queues. The cost of
this coalition is c(S) = |S|λ/(μ − λ). The corre-
sponding tandem game has the property c(S) =∑
i∈S c({i}). Combining this property with the
definition of the core proves the proposition. 
For three-node tandem networks we showed that
the core is nonempty by identifying two marginal
vectors that belong to the core, see Theorem 4.
This approach cannot be extended to four-node
networks, as the following example illustrates.
Example 2. Consider the four-node tandem net-
work with arrival rate λ = 1, and service rates
μ1 = 8, μ2 = 6, μ3 = 4 and μ4 = 2. The costs of
the various coalitions in the corresponding tandem
game are given in Table I. The 24 marginal vectors
are listed in Table II.
One can verify that none of these marginal vec-
tors belongs to the core of the game. However, the
core of the game is nonempty since, for example,
the allocation x = (15, 180, 315, 480)/990 belongs
to the core. 
We need a different approach to study the core
of the four-node tandem game. Further research is
needed to determine if cooperation is also benefi-
cial for tandem networks with at least four nodes.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
A. Conclusions
For the particular model we analyzed, so far we
found the following partial answers to the question
if and how cooperation will take place:
• In two-node networks, cooperation will al-
ways take place, and there are many ways to
share the cost such that the new situation is
preferred by both operators. Interestingly, it
may happen (depending on parameters) that
the queue with largest capacity will have
negative cost, in other words it may be paid
by the other queue for the cooperation.
• In three-node networks, cooperation will al-
ways take place, since cost allocations exist
such that any combination (or coalition) of
queues has lower (or equal) total cost than
in the case without cooperation. One class of
cost allocations is such that the queue with
‘middle’ capacity will pay the same cost as
without cooperation.
• In networks with more than three nodes, it is
not clear whether a cost allocation (always)
exists that satisfies all possible coalitions.
Case studies suggest that cooperation is still
beneficial for the four-queue case.
B. Future work
As mentioned in the introduction, many as-
sumptions can be done within our framework of
‘queueing network games’. In particular we intend
to further develop the current model, leading to
a complete characterization of the cases that may
occur for the general n-node tandem model. If this
is feasible, some of the results can probably be
generalized to a more general (Jackson) network
topology.
Another way of “sharing capacity” would be to
change the routing pattern such that ‘underloaded’
queues can provide service to jobs that otherwise
would have been routed to other (highly loaded)
queues.
Finally, it would also be interesting to consider
dynamic ways of cooperation, and/or stochastic
cost structures.
S {1} {2} {3} {4} {1,2} {1,3} {1,4} {2,3} {2,4} {3,4}
c(S) 1/7 1/5 1/3 1 1/3 2/5 1/2 1/2 2/3 1
S {1,2,3} {1,2,4} {1,3,4} {2,3,4} {1,2,3,4}
c(S) 3/5 9/13 9/11 1 1
TABLE I
COSTS OF ALL COALITIONS FOR THE GAME IN EXAMPLE 2.
m1234 m1243 m1324 m1342 m1423 m1432 m2134 m2143 m2314 m2341 m2413 m2431
0.143 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.133 0.133 0.100 0 0.026 0
0.190 0.190 0.400 0.182 0.192 0.182 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200
0.267 0.308 0.257 0.257 0.308 0.318 0.267 0.308 0.300 0.300 0.308 0.333
0.400 0.359 0.200 0.418 0.357 0.357 0.400 0.359 0.400 0.500 0.467 0.467
m3124 m3142 m3214 m3241 m3412 m3421 m4123 m4132 m4213 m4231 m4312 m4321
0.067 0.067 0.100 0 -0.182 0 -0.500 -0.500 0.026 0 -0.182 0
0.200 0.182 0.167 0.167 0.182 0 0.192 0.182 -0.333 -0.333 0.182 0
0.333 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.308 0.318 0.308 0.333 0 0
0.400 0.418 0.400 0.500 0.667 0.667 1 1 1 1 1 1
TABLE II
THE 24 MARGINAL VECTORS OF THE GAME IN EXAMPLE 2. TOP TO BOTTOM ENTRIES CORRESPOND TO PLAYERS 1 TILL 4.
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